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Why did Great Britain rise as a hegemon in the 18th century Europe? What was the 
role of sovereign borrowing in the process? Great Britain had access to 
unprecedented levels of war finances via the expansion of the debt market in the 
early eighteenth century, and its eventual success was reflected in Britain’s 
prodigal expenditure on military and naval equipment. Effective government 
borrowing has hitherto become one of the predominant factors in explaining the 
rise of Great Britain as a global hegemon in the eighteenth century. 
This dissertation focused on the eighteenth century Anglo-French rivalry 
underpinning British financial growth to argue that the pressure to financially 
outperform France provided Britain the incentives to implement schemes that 
restructured the debt market, from public ownership of debt to modern forms of 
private holdings. The two grand schemes were to convert the unfunded debt to the 
funded debt by inducing interest rate flexibility of loans and reducing the cost of 
debt via the sinking fund and the South Sea Bubble. The implementation of each 
scheme was triggered by financial developments in France. As a result, the two 
schemes committed Britain to lower the cost of its national debt and 
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institutionalize private sector control over the national debt.  
The thesis, in particular, focuses on the financial developments from 1700 to 
1720 because when distinguishing the different types of debt, the twenty years 
starting from 1700 to 1720 is the transitional period where old forms of debt are 
restructured to modern forms of funded debt. In other words, the ownership of the 
national debt restructures from the public sector to the private sector, typically in 
forms of the bond market. This dissertation has divided the twenty years into 
1700-1710 and 1710-1720 to analyze major financial developments that enabled 
the restructuring of the national debt. 
 From 1700 to 1710, two political events affected Britain to compete for its 
fiscal-military reputation over France, in order to secure finance in the debt 
market. Britain’s military outperformance over France and internationalization of 
the British debt market, made Britain increasingly reluctant to forgo its future 
finances by reneging its commitment. To sustain the inflow of investment from 
foreign creditors, reputation fiscal-military mattered and especially Britain had the 
pressure to consistently manifest her devotion to consistent implementation of debt 
servicing policies despite domestic complexities. 
From 1710 to 1720, Britain implemented two grand schemes that restructured 
British national debt from unfunded debt to modern forms of funded debt. Each of 
the schemes was achieved in response to the financial developments in France. 
The first scheme to lower the interest rate of the national debt was implemented by 
the Tories in 1711 via the founding of the South Sea Company. This scheme was 
triggered by developments in 1702 France where their saving banks were re-
established and their Treasury notes were circulating faster via the lowered interest 
rate on the Treaty notes. The second scheme to repay the debt was implemented by 
the Whigs in 1716 in response to the seemingly rapid fiscal recovery of France via 
the development of the Mississippi Company in 1716. In response, Britain actively 
sought to repay their public debt via the sinking fund and lower the cost of debt 
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further by generating the South Sea Bubble that encouraged the private sector to 
provide speculative incentives to absorb the old forms of debt to modern forms of 
government bonds.  
The thesis, thus, provides two significant implications for international 
political economy. First, this thesis shows how inter-state relations influence the 
trajectories of financial growth for a state. I argued that the international dimension 
or the Anglo-French rivalry provides a better explanation in explaining the 
restructuring of old forms of national debt to modern forms of national debt. 
Recasting the international dimension to the discussion suggests that international 
factors can equally, and more powerfully explain government finance.  
More importantly, however, this thesis provides implications for hegemonic 
rivalry and its effect on financial growth. Anglo-French rivalry played an 
important role in setting the foundation for the rise of British finance, and not 
necessarily the endogenous factors of the British hegemon. Anglo-French rivalry 
and the continental war in Europe provided Britain the pressure to go beyond 
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1. Inter-state Politics and the Development of Credit 
‘War made the state, and the state made war,’ is a dictum remarked by Charles 
Tilly that helps capture the essence behind the rise of powerful fiscal-military 
states in the eighteenth century Europe.1 Major powers involved in the European 
struggle for power saw that credit was the backbone of their economic system at 
war. Military success was determined largely by the ability to find money at the 
decisive moment, and not a moment later. The correlation between power and 
credit provided greater implications for major powers in Europe when the 
eighteenth century Europe witnessed the rise of a new hegemon: Great Britain.2  
Great Britain had access to unprecedented levels of war finances via the 
expansion of the debt market in the early eighteenth century, and its eventual 
success was reflected in Britain’s prodigal expenditure on military and naval 
equipment.3 The importance of credit was already well understood within the 
British political circles towards the end of the seventeenth century as Charles 
Davenant, states in his essay, An Essay upon Ways and Means of Supplying the 
War (1695), “the whole Art of War is in a manner reduced to Money, …, who can 
                                                
1 Charles Tilly, “Reflections on the History of European State Making,” in Charles Tilly (ed) The 
Formation of National States in Western Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p.42. 
This view was first revisited by Brewer to explain the British rise as a powerful fiscal-military state 
between 1688 and 1714. See John, Brewer, The sinews of power: War, money, and the English state, 
1688-1783 (London: Harvard University Press, 1990). 
2 The Acts of Union of 1707 united England and Scotland into the political union of Great Britain.  
3 British Military spending was on average 16% of British total revenue during the War of the Grand 
Alliance, 13% during the War of the Spanish Succession and 15 % during the Seven Years War. The 
highest military spending was in 1711which recorded an extraordinary amount of 34% of total 
revenue, which accounts for £12,663,000 alone in this year. See, Brian R. Mitchell, British Historical 
Statistics (Cambridge University Press, 2011), Public Finance 2 
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best find Money to feed, clothe and pay his army, not he that has the most valiant 
Troops, is surest of Success and Conquest.”4 Effective government borrowing has 
hitherto become one of the predominant factors in explaining the rise of Great 
Britain as a global hegemon in the eighteenth century.5 
This paper thus argues that there are three advantages to narrowing the 
analytical focus to the role of finance in explaining the rise of a hegemon. 6 First, 
the role of finance is essential in state-building and improving state capabilities 
against other states in the modern international system.  The ability to tax and raise 
public funds has been considered as the most important source of state power, 
referred to as the “sinews of power” by Brewer (1990). Moreover, Great Britain is 
a critical case because it is the first country to have accumulated unprecedented 
levels of sovereign debt in the modern sense after the financial reform of 1688.  
Second, the transition of power in the modern international system almost 
always involves the transition of financial powers.7 For example, the financial 
center relocated from Venice to Antwerp in 1500, Antwerp to Amsterdam in 1590, 
                                                
4 Charles Davenant, An Essay upon Ways and Means of Supplying the War (London, 1695), pp. 26-7, 
re-quoted from Anne L. Murphy, The Origins of English Financial Markets (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p.39. 
5 Sovereign debt or government borrowing refers to the sale of bills and bonds issued by the Bank of 
England (1694) or the South Sea Company (1711). Origins of British national debt is found during 
the reign of William III (1689-1694), who organized City traders and merchants to offer for sale of an 
issue of government debt. This syndicate soon evolved into the Bank of England. Later, the South Sea 
Company, another trading company, was in charge of the national debt to finance the wars. Before the 
17th century, it was customary for the state to fund its war debt by levying new taxes. 
6 Finance is a type of property that “consists of notes, public funds, actions, royal securities bearing 
interests, the fruits or interest of which are not destroyed by consumption, like those of the earth, but 
are permanent and unperishable, and multiply in every hand they pass through, yet, under the auspices 
of credit and circulation, preserve their fertility”; Isaac de Pinto, Traité de la Circulation et du Crédit 
[An Essay on Circulation and Credit] (Amsterdam, 1771), p.130-131.  
7 A financial center is capable of financing international trade and investment to foreign states; 
Youssef Cassis, Capitals of Capital: The Rise and Fall of International Financial Centers 1780-2009 
(Cambridge University Press, 2010), p.19. 
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and Amsterdam to London in 1790.8 The relocation of financial centers was 
closely related to the transition of power from Spain who controlled the city of 
Antwerp, to the Dutch Republic and to England. 9  Thus, it is highly illustrative to 
focus on the competition or interaction of new powers from the perspective of 
finance in understanding the dynamics of power transition.10 
Last, this paper revisits the role of hegemonic rivalry or the inter-state rivalry 
underpinning the financial growth of the rising power. In the case of the eighteenth 
century Europe, Anglo-French rivalry played an important role in setting the 
foundation for the rise of British finance, and not necessarily the endogenous 
factors of the British hegemon. Anglo-French rivalry and the continental war in 
Europe provided Britain the pressure to go beyond domestic political complexities 




                                                
8 Hopkins argues that the Dutch financial hegemony reached its peak during 1620-78. On the other 
hand, Wallerstein argues that the economic hegemony of the Dutch can be assumed to have lasted 
until the early 1700s, when focusing on the commercial aspect rather than the financial aspect. For 
further discussion refer to David Wilkinson, “Authenticating seventeenth century ‘hegemonies’: 
Dutch, Spanish, French or None?,” in Salvatore Babones and Christopher Chase-Dunn (eds.),  
Routledge Handbook of World-Systems Analysis (Routledge, 2012), p.181. 
9 The city of Antwerp was a city in Belgium (Low Countries) that was under the Spanish control 
during the 16th century. Local monied interests were forbidden to engage in trade and therefore 
foreigners controlled the finances of the city of Antwerp. Foreign monied interests predominantly 
included traders from Spain, Portugal and Venice.  
10  Disagreements continue as to whether 16th and 17th century European system was unipolar, 
multipolar or neither. However, focus on finance allows the application of the power transition theory 
to 17th century Europe. For further discussions refer to David Wilkinson, “Authenticating seventeenth 
century ‘hegemonies’: Dutch, Spanish, French or None?,” in Salvatore Babones and Christopher 




Why did Great Britain rise as a hegemon in the 18th century Europe? What was the 
role of sovereign borrowing in the process? The goal of this paper is to explain the 
rise of Great Britain as a global hegemon in the 18th century.  
Successful mobilization of war finances in Great Britain after the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688 intrigued many scholars to analyze the leading factors for 
efficient government borrowing.11 Literature on sovereign debt stress that financial 
channels or sovereign borrowing cannot expand if there are no security measures 
that guarantee the rules of exchange in financial markets. Britain found two 
alternatives in securing credibility. One was to take advantage of institutions that 
promote revenue and the other was to strengthen institutions that veto default. 
Brewer (1990) focuses on the importance of revenue in which he contends that 
Britain was able to supply the series of war ranging from the War of the Grand 
Alliance (1688-97) to the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14) by acquiring 
high taxes and a well-organized civil administration to secure its standing army as 
a major European power.  
North and Weingast (1989), on the other hand, emphasize the role of 
institutions that veto default by illustrating how setting constitutional rules to 
constrain a sovereign from violating commitments provided a critical momentum 
for Britain to enhance its credibility. Stasavage (2012) takes a step further to stress 
that mere institutional development is not enough but having creditor interests 
involved in the majority coalition in representative assemblies is necessary.  
                                                
11 Government borrowing or public debt refers to the sale of bills and bonds issued by the Bank of 
England (1694) or the South Sea Company(1711). Origins of British national debt is found during the 
reign of William III (1689-1694), who organized City traders and merchants to offer for sale of an 
issue of government debt. This syndicate soon evolved into the Bank of England. Later, a trading 
company, the South Sea Company was in charge of the national debt to finance the wars. Before the 
17th century, it was customary for the state to fund its war debt by levying new taxes. 
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Preceding approaches are resourceful, however, they fail to capture the role of 
inter-state rivalry underpinning financial growth. This failure arises from 
undistinguishing the different types of public debt, which yields two specific 
shortcomings. One account is that focusing solely on the trend of the aggregate 
sum of the debt can oversee the fact that the composition of the national debt 
underwent significant transformations. In fact, modern forms of funded debt start 
to override old forms of unfunded debt only by 1720, a time lag that cannot solely 
be explained by the constitutional reform in 1688 and the establishment of the 
Bank of England in 1694. Therefore changes between 1710 and 1720 need greater 
attention to understand the development of the modern forms of debt.  
Another insufficiency is the assumption of the multiple veto-points approach, 
which argues that the delegation of debt ownership to the private sector was a 
desired and permanent outcome of the parliament. Cox (2012) limits the 
parliamentary role, arguing that debt accumulation had not been a favorable option 
for the parliament since repayment responsibilities were attributed to the 
parliament. In fact, Britain as a typical emerging economy struggled with 
structural inflexibility and needed strategic planning to restructure the national 
debt from unfunded debt to funded debt. Broz and Grossman (2004) contend that 
the private corporations including the Bank of England was not a permanent 
institution, but a political actor that had to renew its charter and build strategies to 
deal with the uncertainty that it can be dissolved by the parliament upon one year’s 
notice.  
Understanding the international dimension of British financial development, 
on the other hand, complements for the missing explanations of the expansion of 
funded debt between 1710 and 1720. According to the partisan politics approach, 
policies favorable for debt servicing is possible only when the creditor interests are 
included in the majority coalition in representative bodies. However, when the 
Tory ministry came to power in 1711 to 1714, their coalition including the landed 
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interests or non-creditor interests did not draw back from debt-servicing policies 
and instead actively sought to implement schemes to sustain and expand the public 
debt to modern forms of debt. The paper thus shows that the international 
dimension has great leverage in explaining the expansion of funded debt between 
1710 and 1720 by showing that the Anglo-French hegemonic rivalry pressured 
Britain to go beyond domestic political complexities and consistently implement 
policies favorable to debt-servicing. 
 
 
3. Research Method 
1) Subject 
This paper performs a single case study of Great Britain after the Glorious 
Revolution. Great Britain is a critical case because it is the first country to have 
developed national debt in the modern sense. The modern financial system of 
banking and financial markets enabled the creation of debt through the issue of 
bills and bonds after the changes followed by the Glorious Revolution. 
To understand the rise of Britain from the perspective of finance, the thesis 
focuses on the inter-state rivalry underpinning financial growth. Centering on the 
expansion of the funded debt between 1700 and 1720, this paper argues that the 
Anglo-French rivalry enabled Britain to achieve modern forms of public debt. 
Britain’s fiscal reputation was an important factor in drawing creditors to invest in 
the British debt market in competition to the debt market of France. The pressure 
to outperform France in securing future finances and attracting creditors, provided 
Britain the incentives to implement fiscal policies favorable to debt servicing 
which consequently restructured the debt market, from public ownership of debt to 
modern forms of private ownership of debt. This was conducted under two grand 
schemes: absorption of the unfunded debt by the funded debt via the sinking fund 




2) Reputational Rivalry and Credible Commitment 
The depiction of the Glorious Revolution as the triumph of the parliament, have 
hitherto driven the literature of credible commitment to set institutional veto points 
as the condition precedent to financial development. The role of reputation in 
public borrowing became marginalized and it no longer was the driving force for 
the development of institutional devices, but institutions itself became the 
pronominal word for reputation. The institutional veto points approach argues that 
the preceding practice to rely on the Crown’s reputation became insufficient to 
police the default of the Crown and required institutional veto players to secure 
credibility. According to this approach, to solely rely on the Crown’s reputation 
would situate the monied interest into vulnerable positions. In other words, the 
sovereign would face stronger incentives to renege, whenever the sovereign has his 
survival at stake and heavily discounts the future for its present credit needs. 
In this paper, I recast the role of reputation in the literature of sovereign debt. 
To be specific, I argue that the Anglo-French competition for a greater fiscal-
military reputation triggered the restructuring of British national debt from old 
forms of debt to modern forms of funded debt between 1700 and 1720. The two 
political events between 1700 and 1710–Britain’s stronger commitment as a 
balancer of Europe and internationalization of the British debt market - 
strengthened British reputation against France, the predominant factor in 
determining British future finances in the financial market. Reputation of the state, 
and not of the Crown, was important because it drew creditors to invest in British 
national debt and encouraged speculation or greater risk-taking behavior in the 
British financial market. 
According to the reputational theory forwarded by Tomz (2007), reputation of 
a state can be defined as the impression creditors hold about the borrower. In other 
words, the flow of investment is dependent on the impression creditors hold on the 
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host country. Also, in international debt markets with repeat play, the reputation of 
the borrower develops under the conditions of incomplete information in the 
market. The condition of incomplete information can be particularly stronger when 
applying the reputational theory to the eighteenth century financial markets where 
investors had a stronger tendency to herd their investment based on what was 
manifested: military prowess and favorable debt servicing policies of the host 
country. 
The reputational theory of Tomz also argues that political changes in the 
borrower country can cause the reputation of the borrower to be altered. Attaining 
consistency in government preference over debt servicing is an uneasy task for 
emerging economies as debt repayment creates economic winners and losers.12 
However, Britain was able to minimize the influence of divided opinions over her 
commitment to debt servicing by prioritizing her fiscal-military reputation against 
France, which generated investor confidence for the investors. 
From the perspective of creditors, Britain was still a financial pygmy 
compared to her counterpart France, at the outset of the Glorious Revolution and 
the political stability of its regime was as questionable as its credit. However, 
Britain’s military outperformance over France in the European mainland and the 
prospect that Britain would soon parallel the major military powers of eighteenth-
century Europe generated the impression that speculative investment in British 
debt would yield high net worth. From the perspective of Britain, as the borrowing 
state, future channels of finances were valued to sustain the protracted war in 
Europe. Consequently Britain became increasingly reluctant to forgo its future 
finances by reneging its commitment and instead faced the burden to manifest 
policies that were favorable to debt servicing. 
                                                
12  Jeff Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940,” International 
Organization 42:1(1988), pp.59-90. 
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4. Outline of the Dissertation 
This paper argues that the development of British finance was embedded in the 
Anglo-French fiscal-military rivalry. 13 The article focuses on the expansion of the 
modern forms of funded debt between 1700 and 1720 to explain how Anglo-
French rivalry provided the impetus to restructure British national debt from 
unfunded debt to modern forms of funded debt. 
Chapter 2 provides an in-depth review of the preceding literatures regarding 
British development of finance in the eighteenth century. The chapter divides the 
approaches of the existing literature into two categories: institutions that promote 
revenue and institution that veto default. Literatures that stress the importance of 
institutions that promote revenue have emphasized factors including taxation, 
civilized civil administration and the determination to act as a major power. On the 
other hand, literature that stress the importance of institutions that veto default, 
focuses on the establishment of multiple veto points and the incorporation of 
monied interest in the majority coalition at representative assemblies. Tracing the 
development of the literature on British finance and debt will help the reader to 
understand the limits of the preceding literature along with the contributions of this 
paper in highlighting the international dimension of the development of debt. 
Chapter 3 provides the background of the advent of public borrowing in 
Britain. The first section of the chapter provides the historical background of the 
financial revolution after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 by tracing the political 
                                                
13 Among other literatures that focus on bilateral relations to explain international systemic change, 
the paper particularly expands on Park (2000), which applies the bilateral framework in explaining 
the emergence of the gold standard in the 19th century Europe.  Park states that “international regimes 
are embedded in concrete inter-state relations” whereby the “timing and terms of emergence of the 
first international monetary regime was determined neither by a hegemonic state nor a natural 
evolutionary process of money economy, but hostile inter-state relations between France and 
Germany.”; Jong Hee Park, The Rise of the Classical Gold Standard: Inter-State Relations and the 
Mergence of International Regime, M.A. Dissertation, Seoul National University, 2000. 
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history behind the implementation of the modern forms of debt. The second 
section of the chapter explains the technicalities of the different types of debt: 
terminable annuities, unfunded debt and funded debt. Understanding the difference 
between the different forms of debt illustrated in this section is crucial not only 
because it contours the restructuring of the national debt that took place in the 
1700s and the 1720s, but more importantly because it helps the reader understand 
why shifting the focus from 1688 to the 1710s and 1720s is important in 
explaining the development of finance in Britain.  
 Chapter 4 focuses on the developments between 1700 and 1710 to 
emphasize two important political changes after the Glorious Revolution that 
reconstructed Britain’s reputation in the debt market. This section argues that the 
two political events- Britain’s military outperformance over France and 
internationalization of the British debt market – elevated British reputation as a 
competent fiscal-military power parallel to France. This chapter shows that as 
Britain took on a greater proportional role in the conflict with Louis XIV among 
the Grand Alliance, the state became increasingly reluctant to forgo its future 
finances by reneging its commitment. To sustain the inflow of investment in 
Britain under the prospect of protracted wars in Europe, British fiscal-military 
outperformance against France became important for Britain.  
 Chapter 5 focuses on the developments between 1710 and 1720 to explain 
how Anglo-French rivalry triggered consistent government preference for debt 
servicing policies despite the shifting powers in the House of Commons between 
the monied interest Whigs and the landed interest Tories. The section outlines two 
grand schemes in Britain that significantly contributed to the expansion of the 
British debt: absorption of the unfunded debt by the funded debt via the sinking 
fund and marketization of the cost of debt by inducing interest rate flexibility of 
loans. This section tackles the two developments separately to analyze how each 
scheme was triggered by the financial developments in France that pressured 
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Britain to adopt better debt servicing policies to its creditors compared to what was 
provided in France. 
 In the conclusion, the paper summarizes the arguments forwarded in this 
paper with implications the British experience has on hegemonic rivalry and its 




II. Literature Review 
 
Successful mobilization of war finances in Great Britain after the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688 intrigued many scholars to analyze the leading factors for 
efficient government borrowing. Literature on sovereign debt stress that financial 
channels or sovereign borrowing cannot expand if there are no security measures 
that guarantee the rules of exchange in financial markets. Britain found two 
alternatives in securing credibility. One was to take advantage of institutions that 
promote revenue and the other was to strengthen institutions that veto default. 
 
1. Institutions that Promote Revenue  
1) Taxation 
The importance of government revenue in relation to the development of modern 
forms of long-term public debt is most extensively studied by John Brewer in his 
book The Sinews of Power (1989). Brewer argues that Great Britain was able to 
develop the system of long-term debt because it had the securities of loans rooted 
in the strong inflow of government revenue via taxation. In other words, public 
creditors invested in Britain’s government securities precisely because they were 
backed up by a solid tax system. Because Britain had a strong tax system, creditors 
believed that Britain had the capacity and determination to meet its payments. 
Brewer further argues modern forms of public debt such as the funded debt that 
started to appear after 1688 was possible only because specific taxes were 
earmarked to back up the delivery of debts. 
Brewer focuses on how military funding and tax collection was obtained in 
Great Britain from the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-97) to the War of the 
Spanish Succession (1701-14). In particular, Brewer emphasizes the change in the 
means of tax collection, from direct tax to indirect tax, as a major fiscal 
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development in Britain that provided the British government with the advantage of 
increased state revenue and surplus of credit to channel war finances. Throughout 
1688 to 1714, direct taxation, such as land tax implemented by William and Mary 
dominated until the indirect taxation became prominent towards the end of the 
eighteenth century. Indirect taxation, including custom and excise duties, 
eventually enabled the development of national debt in Britain.  
 
2) Centralized Civil Administration 
Literature that stress the importance of a centralized civil administration in 
developing a strong credit mechanism for the state, branches out from the literature 
of taxation. Epstein (1994) builds on the arguments of Brewer to argue that Britain 
was able to attain an advanced fiscal system over the major power of Europe in the 
eighteenth century because it developed an efficient administrative system. Put 
differently, the constitutional reform in 1688 that strengthened the British 
parliament was not sufficient to secure government’s greater access to national 
revenue, but implementation of an efficient administration was a necessary 
condition for the British government to gain supply for a substantial regular 
income. 
Both literatures discuss the distinctive traits of the British administration that 
generated greater tolerance within the British population to accept taxation. One 
distinction was that Britain managed tax farming via the development of a large 
centralized bureaucracy. Centrally appointed government officials conducted tax 
collection and this contrasted with the practices of other financial states including 
France and Prussia where tax farming was largely under the supervision of private 
financiers which gave room for corruption. Another distinction was the 
bureaucratic practice with a strong fiscal uniformity. Britain imposed tax to its 
subjects equally with no special fiscal privileges to any county, region or subjects 
with high social ranks.  France and Prussia on the other hand had different levels 
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of compliance for the payment of taxes and tolerated legal exemption for the 
privileged class. Britain’s bureaucracy was also transparent that presentation of 
accounts and reports were required by the parliament. Centrality, transparently and 
the strong legality of the British bureaucracy facilitated channeling of tax monies 
without much public resentment. 
  
3) Determination to Act as a Major Power 
Hintze (1906), Brewer (1989), Tilly (1990) and Downing (1992) have hinted that 
war is a powerful force prompting rulers to alter the structure of their polity's 
political and bureaucratic institutions. Their perspective taps into the argument that 
the determination to act as a major power is essential for a state to seek for the 
expansion of one’s credit. In eighteenth century Europe, where armies were paid 
and not conscripted, efforts to raise large armies also required the rapid 
mobilization of large sums of money. This was especially the case for Britain after 
1688 as it joined the Grand Alliance to balance against the expanding French 
forces under Louis XIV. Already between 1688 and 1714, 75 percent of British 
public expenditure was used for military operations and other war finances.14 
Explanations for the role of the state’s determination to act as a major power 
underpinning the development of state credit has left many hypotheses based on 
international factors untested, in which this paper partly expands. 
 
 
2. Institutions that Veto Default 
1) Multiple Veto Points 
North and Weingast (1989) emphasize the role of institutions that veto default by 
                                                
14 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (Harvard 
University Press, 1990), p.110. 
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illustrating how setting constitutional rules to constrain a sovereign from violating 
commitments provided a critical momentum for Britain to enhance its credibility. 
The Glorious Revolution was the constitutional reform that controlled the arbitrary 
and confiscatory power of the Crown. After the Glorious Revolution, the Crown 
had to obtain the assent from the Parliament to gain access to war funds. This 
constitutional check and balance system between the Crown and the Parliament 
enhanced the credibility of the British government and enabled the British 
government to have access to unprecedented levels of funds. Access to these funds 
played a critical role in the emergence of Britain as a global hegemon. 
 
2) Partisan Politics 
Stasavage (2012) argues that mere institutional development is not enough but 
having creditor interests involved in the majority coalition in representative 
assemblies is necessary. In other words, constitutional division of power is not 
sufficient to make the government more publicly accountable. The veto power of 
the Parliament only became enforceable when the coalition of the ruling party 
consisted of creditors.  
Stasavage provides an in-depth analysis on the political issues of 17th and 
18th century England to show that the monied interests formed the Whig coalition 
with religious interest groups who supported Protestantism and the transformation 
of the hereditary succession. The descriptive analysis by Stasavage can be 
analyzed as in Table II-1. Stasavage argues that during the Whig ministry the 
presence of creditors in the ruling party provided incentives for the parliament to 








Table II-1. Political Division over Issues 





-Government creditors  
-Shareholders of Bank of 
England and East India 
Company 
-Small and medium land owners 
-Support from Peripheral 
regions 
-closely associated with South 
Sea Company (often regarded 
as rival of East India Company) 
Religious 
toleration 
Dissenters: non-adherents of Church of England 
Toleration of Dissenters  
Act of Toleration, 168915 





Supported transfer of 
succession  
Act of settlement, 170116 
Supporter of King's prerogative 
and hereditary succession. 





Court vs. Country 
(Strong executive vs. restriction of the power of executive) 
Not consistent Not consistent 





- Monied interest 
-Financing war expenditures 
Landed interest 
- unsatisfied with ex post facto 
distributional conflict to taxing 
land owners for repayment 
Source: David Stasavage, Public Debt and the Birth of the Democratic State: France and 
Great Britain, 1688 – 1789 (Cambridge University Press, 2003), p.101-114. 
 
                                                
15 The Act of Toleration 1689 permitted "Dissenters" who worshipped in churches other than the 
Church of Engalnd, to establish their own places of worship. 
16 Act of Settlement 1701 approved the succession of the Crown to the House of Hanover. 
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3) Private Institutions 
The emphasis on the activities of private institution is initiated by the discussions 
of Cox (2012) who limits the Parliamentary role, arguing that debt accumulation 
had not been a favorable option for the parliament since repayment responsibilities 
were attributed to the parliament. Broz and Grossman (2004) expands this 
argument to contend that the private corporations including the Bank of England 
were important political actors that successfully won over greater proportions of 
the national debt to the private sector by renewing its charter and building political 
strategies that overcame the uncertainty of being dissolved by the Parliament upon 
one year’s notice.  
Neal (2000) expands this approach by focusing on the role of the informal 
entente more than that of the private institutions. Neal states that the chartering of 
the Bank of England in 1694 and its monopoly over the issue of notes in 1706 
provided privileges for the goldsmith bankers acting as trustees for creditors 
holding claims on the British government. The goldsmith bankers expanded the 
scale of banking activities by facilitating trades over government annuities and 
shares of government chartered corporations. As De Vrie and Van der Woude 
(1997) would agree, this smaller and narrower pool of credit suppliers created an 
institutional power of its own, promoting the interests of haute-financers and 
monied interests in representative assemblies. 
 
 
3. Limits and Implications 
1) Limits to the Institutions that Promote Revenue 
To solely rely on the tax system to explain the expansion of British credit in the 
early eighteenth century has two limits. First, France extracted greater amounts of 
revenue compared to Britain during the eighteenth century. In describing the 
superiority of the tax system in France, a historical essay of a Dutch Jew investor, 
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Isaac de Pinto Traité de la Circulation et du Crédit [An Essay on Circulation and 
Credit] (1771) notes, 
“a nation [France] that would submit to pay heavy taxes without 
reluctance, and that, as the author supposes, would pay them from a 
spirit of emulation, and where the application of the revenue should be 
constantly directed to the public good, without any part of it being 
diverted, would be a nation of angels, or rather of gods, and such a one 
as never will exist upon this mass of earth.”17 
As Figure II-1 shows, it was not until the 1790s that the British total revenue 
excelled the total tax revenue in France. While Britain expanded expenditure in 
unprecedented levels during the 1710s and 1720s, British tax revenue only steadily 
increased. In fact, Britain was relatively weak in financing enough credit through 
taxation in comparison to France. France, on the other hand, had greater leverage 
over financial mobilization, financing on average 1.48 times greater amount of 
total revenue compared to Britain. Under the monarchic structure, the French 
finance minister appointed by King was given absolute authority to extract finances 
and fund expansionist wars.18 Thus, to solely rely on the development of the British 
system for taxation may have limits in explaining the expansion of British finance 
in the early eighteenth century. 
Second, the expansion of the British revenue in the early eighteenth century 
partly explains for the expansion of public debt, however, it its insufficient to 
explain why the transition from short-term loans to long-term funded loans 
occurred during the 1720s and not years later. Brewer argued that the steady 
increase in British tax contributed to the expansion of public borrowing as specific 
taxes were earmarked to back up the delivery of debts. He also explained that it 
                                                
17  Isaac de Pinto, Traité de la Circulation et du Crédit [An Essay on Circulation and Credit] 
(Amsterdam, 1771),  p.133. 
18 John Brewer, The Sinews of Power: War, Money and the English State, 1688-1783 (Harvard 
University Press, 1990). 
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took time for such sound system to evolve as the government’s short-term loans 
led to the emergence of the long-term debt.19 However, he fails to specify the 
factors that drove the transition from short-term loans to long-term loans during 
the 1710s and 1720s.  
 
Figure II–1.  Total Revenue of France and England, 1660-1800 


































Source: Mark Dincecco, Political Transformations and Public Finances 




                                                
19 John, Brewer, The sinews of power: War, money, and the English state, 1688-1783 (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), p.74. 
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2) Limits to the Institutions that Veto Default 
Patrick O'Brien(2002), Carl Wennerlind(2011)20 and Stephan Epstein21 argue that 
narratives that place the Glorious revolution as a central conjecture are misleading 
and instead, the fiscal revolution had been a continuous process. O'Brien insists 
that the English Civil War should continue to be the fiscal transformative point, 
e.g. Bill of Rights 1689, instead of the Glorious Revolution because the role of 
parliament had gradually strengthened since the English Civil War. Wennerlind 
delivers similar arguments by tracing the intellectual underpinnings that led to the 
Financial Revolution. Wennerlind argues that the Revolution and its "financial 
architecture" would not have been possible without prior revolutions22.  
More importantly, however, the failure of the preceding literature is to 
undistinguishing the different types of public debt, which yields three specific 
shortcomings. One account is that focusing solely on the trend of the aggregate 
sum of the debt can oversee the fact that the composition of the national debt 
underwent significant transformations. In fact, modern forms of funded debt start 
to override old forms of unfunded debt only by 1720, a time lag that cannot solely 
be explained by the constitutional reform in 1688 and the establishment of the 
Bank of England in 1694. Therefore changes between 1710 and 1720 need greater 
attention to understand the development of the modern forms of debt.  
Another insufficiency is the assumption of the intuitionalist approach that 
delegation of debt ownership to the private sector was a desired and permanent 
outcome of the parliament. Cox (2012) limits the Parliamentary role, arguing that 
debt accumulation had not been a favorable option for the parliament since 
repayment responsibilities were attributed to the Parliament. In fact, Britain as a 
                                                
20 Carl Wennerlind, The Casualties of Credit, (Harvard University Press, 2011). 
21 Stephan R. Epstein, “Freedom and Growth: The European Miracle”, Working Papers in Economic 
History of London School of Economics (1994). 
22 Carl Wennerlind, The Casualties of Credit, (Harvard University Press, 2011), p.3. 
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typical emerging economy struggled with structural inflexibility and needed 
strategic planning to restructure the national debt from unfunded debt to funded 
debt. Broz and Grossman (2004) contend that the private corporations including 
the Bank of England was not a permanent institution, but a political actor that had 
to renew its charter and build strategies to deal with the uncertainty that it can be 
dissolved by the Parliament upon one year’s notice.  
Lastly, understanding the expansion of funded debt between 1710 and 1720 
from an international dimension complements for the missing explanations of the 
partisan politics approach. According to the partisan politics approach, policies 
favorable for debt servicing is possible only when the creditor interests are 
included in the majority coalition in representative bodies. However, the Tory 
ministry came to power in 1711 to 1714, their coalition including the landed 
interests or non-creditor interests, did not draw back from, but instead, promoted 
debt servicing policies. The paper thus shows that the international dimension 
better explains the expansion of funded debt between 1710 and 1720 by showing 
that the hegemonic rivalry pressured Britain to go beyond domestic political 
complexities and consistently implement policies favorable to debt servicing 
 
 
4. Chapter Summary 
This chapter provided an in-depth review of the preceding literatures regarding 
British development of finance in the eighteenth century. The first section of this 
chapter divided the approaches of the existing literature into two categories: 
institutions that promote revenue and institution that veto default. Literature that 
argue for the importance of institutions that promote revenue, have stressed factors 
such as taxation, civilized civil administration and the determination to act as a 
major power to explain the rise of Britain as a financial power in the eighteenth 
century. On the other hand, literature that argue for the institutions that veto 
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default has stressed the importance of multiple veto points and the incorporation of 
the monied interest in the majority coalition at representative assemblies.  
In the second section of the chapter, I argued that the limits to the literature 
that emphasize institutions that promote government revenue was that when 
placing British revenue in comparison to France, empirical evidence show that 
British total revenue was not competitive to that of France during the eighteenth 
century. Therefore, it is more convincing to emphasize institutions that veto 
default, or institutions that promoted financing in forms of government debt. The 
limits to the literature that emphasize institutions that veto default, on the other 
hand, was the fact that preceding literature do not distinguish the different types of 
debt that composed the British national debt in the eighteenth century. Therefore, 
preceding literature overlooks the fact that the transition to modern forms of debt 
occurred from 1710 to 1720, and not immediately after the constitutional reform or 




III. Glorious Revolution and the Development of Debt 
 
The financial revolution after the Glorious Revolution of 1688 was indeed a major 
transitional point for Britain to develop her government credibility. The first part 
of this section compares the British state of finance before and after the Glorious 
Revolution of 1688. More specifically, it reviews the political history behind the 
implementation of the modern forms of funded debt. The second part of this 
section explains the technicalities in the different types of debt: terminable 
annuities, unfunded debt and funded debt. Understanding the difference between 
the different forms of debt illustrated in this section is crucial not only because it 
contours the restructuring of the national debt that took place in the 1700s and the 
1710s, but more importantly because it helps the reader understand why shifting 
the focus from 1688 to 1710s and 1720s is important in explaining the 
development of finance in Britain.  
 
1. British State of Finance 
1) State of Credit before the Glorious Revolution 
In the seventeenth century, England was still a financial pygmy compared to the 
major powers in Europe. The Dutch largely directed the prestige as a financial 
power.23 The Dutch had been a forerunner of capitalist development from banking, 
insurance to technological skills of capital investment during the early 17th century 
                                                
23 Hopkins argues that the Dutch financial hegemony reached its peak during the 1620-78. On the 
other hand, Wallerstein argues that the economic hegemony of the Dutch can be assumed to have 
lasted until the early 1700s, when focusing more on the commercial aspect rather than the financial 
aspect. For further discussion refer to David Wilkinson, “Authenticating seventeenth century 
‘hegemonies’: Dutch, Spanish, French or None?,” in Salvatore Babones and Christopher Chase-Dunn 
(eds.),  Routledge Handbook of World-Systems Analysis (Routledge, 2012), p.181. 
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to 18th century. 24 Already in the seventeenth century, Dutch capitalists were 
lending substantial sums to Brandenburg, Denmark, Sweden, Hamburg, Bremen, 
Emden, East Friesland, and the Empire. The benefits of Dutch investment to other 
European commercial powers were well perceived by its contemporaries. A 
historical essay of a Dutch Jew investor, Isaac de Pinto Traité de la Circulation et 
du Crédit [An Essay on Circulation and Credit] (1771) notes, 
“The ready money in Holland serves as a prop to an infinity of 
imaginary riches in vessels, commodities, paper, and public funds; 
and the commercial powers of Europe are so closely connected with 
the Dutch that the latter are, as it were, their factors, their partners, 
and if I may be allowed to say it, their bankers.”25 
On the other hand, the French monarchy led by Louis XIV was rapid in 
catching up the Dutch financial capability.26 France extracted revenue by imposing 
massive tax from its population accompanied by the institutional advantage of 
monarchy in which the finance minister was able to extract money and transfer it 
to military administration. France was capable of raising 4.23 times greater amount 
of national revenue compared to England in the year 1688, where France had total 
                                                
24 Dutch financial innovations included a wide range of modern investment including public bonds, 
acceptance of credit and commission trade, marine insurance and tradable shares in the Dutch East 
India Company (VOC). The Dutch government floated public debts while institutions including the 
Bank of Amsterdam and merchant banks intermediated the investments in the private sector.  See Jan 
de Vries and Ad Van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: Success, Failure, and Perseverance of 
the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 668-74. 
25  Isaac de Pinto, Traité de la Circulation et du Crédit [An Essay on Circulation and Credit] 
(Amsterdam, 1771), p.197. 
26 The central role of taxation in France is well illustrated by Isaac de Pinto, “a nation that would 
submit to pay heavy taxes without reluctance, and that, as the author supposes, would pay them from 
a spirit of emulation, and where the application of the revenue should be constantly directed to the 
public good, without any part of it being diverted, would be a nation of angels, or rather of gods, and 
such a one as never will exist upon this mass of earth”; Isaac de Pinto, Traité de la Circulation et du 
Crédit [An Essay on Circulation and Credit] (Amsterdam, 1771),  p.133. 
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revenue of  £72,886,425 and Britain had  £9,963,183. 27 
Unlike France, Britain had a smaller population and thus actively sought 
alternative means other than land tax to secure exigencies resorted to means of 
borrowing in securing exigencies. Prior to the Glorious Revolution, British 
borrowing in general had been based on the credibility of the Crown. Unlike the 
other European monarchs at the time, the British Crown had no sources of wealth 
that could be mortgaged. The Crown, therefore, pawned the Crown jewels to 
borrow money from foreign Kings and particularly from Amsterdam.28 However, 
the Crown jewels were often subject to delayed redemption due to financial plight 
of the Crown. The obstacle to extensive lending was clearly the inadequate 
security offered by the Crown, and, increasingly, the Crown’s financial position 
became the real constitutional issue within the domestic political circles in 
England.  
Constant struggle over the Crown’s inability to mobilize war finances was 
resolved by choosing to align with the greatest lender, the Dutch, instead of 
France.29 The Glorious Revolution of 1688 to 1689 was a multi-layered event that 
fundamentally changed the power structure of England. It replaced the reigning 
king, James II, with the joint monarchy of his protestant daughter Mary and her 
Dutch husband, William of Orange.30 It set the supremacy of parliament over the 
                                                
27 See Mark Dincecco, Political Transformations and Public Finances (Cambridge University Press, 
2011). 
28 The practice of pawning Crown Jewels dates back to 1625.  
29 The Grand Alliance was a European coalition against Louis XIV found in 1689. The Dutch 
Republic, Austria, Bavaria, Brandenburg, Holy Roman Empire, Ireland, Palatinate of the Rhine, 
Portugal, Savoy, Saxony, Scotland, Spain and Sweden and England were members of the Grand 
Alliance. 
30 Approval of William Orange as the new crown as a consequence of the declining popularity of 
James II in England involved two political interests. Religious interest groups, both Protestants and 
Catholics were infuriated by James II and sought means to prevent the succession of a Catholic 
Crown. Foreign policy interests that involved mercantile interest of Britain also found benefits in 
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crown, Whig over Tory, Protestant over Catholicism, transfer of succession over 
hereditary monarchy, and change of foreign policy from anti-Dutch to anti-
French.31 From the perspective of finance, cooperation between the Dutch and 
Britain created unintended effects to its financial relationship: Dutch financial 
innovations foreign to England were accepted without hostility. 
 
2) State of Credit after the Glorious Revolution 
When William was crowned, much obstructions and difficulties in obtaining 
supplies from parliament remained. Revenue to the King was granted by the 
Parliament on a yearly bases, in which predominantly came with conditions to be 
used for public purposes.32 A historical essay by Allan Ramsay, An Essay on the 
Constitution of England (1765), notes that whenever the King requested supplies 
necessary for carrying on a war, “every session opened with clamor and 
                                                                                                                        
approving William III as the new crown. James II and his regime provoked passionate resentment 
among a wide range of the English population. James regime was in this sense infuriated both by the 
Protestant and Catholicism, as James II being a Devout Catholic, attempted to modernize Britain’s 
Catholicism on ideological premises taken from French Catholicism that not only directed against 
Protestant but also against pop Innocent XI. Protestant Mary Stuart, the oldest daughter of James and 
the wife of William III, therefore were not fiercely opposed against when they had invaded England 
to displace James II.  
31 Foreign policy concerns were at the center in accepting Mary Stuart and William Orange as the new 
crown. Domestic debates continued over whether Britain should adopt the blue policy or the continent 
policy in which became the bases for supporting Dutch or the French. In fact, Britain was given a 
choice between bandwagoning with the challenger, and remaining cooperative to the status quo power. 
Disagreements on foreign policy were extensive and politicized between the Tories and the Whigs 
that it had not been settled even in the early 1700s. For continued struggle over the foreign policy 
between Whigs and Tories in the early 1700s see Doohwan Ahn, “The Anglo-French Treaty of 
commerce of 1713: Tory Trade Politics and the Question of Dutch Decline”, History of European 
Ideas, Vol.36, No.2 (201), pp.167-180. 




discontent.”33 Clearly, the Parliament was careful to make no generous grants of 
revenues. Such difficulties of the English system obliged King William to 
introduce the Dutch system of loans into England with the expectation that, if 
properly implemented, it would facilitate exigencies and ultimately expand the 
purchasing power of the government. 
The British system soon followed the financial innovation of Netherlands to 
borrow loans by mortgaging a portion of taxes to pay the interest, referred as debt 
charges. In its design, the new forms of debt was an innovative mean to expand 
government finance where its basic principal was to mortgage a portion of taxes 
for the payment of interest for the loaned sum. In this way the country was able to 
pay the minimal cost for the newly created artificial capital, which became 
permanently fixed and solid, and by means of credit, circulated in the public. The 
capital provided unprecedented financial leverage, as it was unexpendable through 
consumption and multipliable through circulation. 34 Britain thus developed debt 
instruments consisting of notes, public funds, actions and royal securities secured 
by taxation. The interest paid, referred as debt charges, therefore, was an 
institution implemented by the government to prevent the demoralization of credit 
and prevent government defaults by substituting debts for a perpetual annual 
charge. Debt charges, or interests, set at the time of initiation of a debt could not be 
reduced unless offering to pay the principal. 
The newly adopted system in Britain thus created two benefits. In the British 
system of public debt, reimbursement of the principal was not a necessary 
requirement, in which “the reimbursement of the debt depends upon the pleasure 
                                                
33 Allan Ramsay, An Essay on the Constitution of England (London: T. Becket & P.A. De Hondt, 65), 
p.81. 
34  Isaac de Pinto, Traité de la Circulation et du Crédit [An Essay on Circulation and Credit] 
(Amsterdam, 1771), pp.130-131. 
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of government.”35 British government was able to borrow more money regardless 
of the already accumulated amount of debt, as long as interests were paid.36 Britain, 
thus expended on great sums of money in which it could not earn in real revenue 
by mortgaging a portion of taxes. As a result, private institutions were now willing 
to lend funds to the government despite the expectations that principal money was 
not set for any reimbursement date in return for monopoly trading rights. For 
example, South Sea Company achieved the monopoly right in the South Americas 
and East India Company had attained monopoly rights in the East 
Indies.37Interestingly enough, as the government increasingly borrowed from the 
private institutions, the ownership of debt shifted to greater proportions of private 
ownership between 1700 and 1720. As a consequence, private institutions that 
pooled investment domestically and internationally became the dominant forms of 
modern debt in Britain by the early 1700s.  Isaac de Pinto characterized Britain 
that “the whole English nation in a body, supported by their credit with foreigners, 
and by a few dealers in the stocks, who contribute not a little to maintain the 
circulation and credit o this immense volume of annuities.” 38 
The second benefit was that Britain was able to enjoy military 
aggrandizement through the facilitated channels of finance. Perceiving financial 
resources as the pillar of military success was apparent as Charles Davenant, An 
                                                
35  Isaac de Pinto, Traité de la Circulation et du Crédit [An Essay on Circulation and Credit] 
(Amsterdam, 1771). 
36 Interest rates, however, could not be readjusted even after the reimbursement of a part of the 
principal. 
37 The company was also granted with the monopoly to trade with South America. At the time it was 
created, Britain was involved in the War of the Spanish Succession while Spain still controlled South 
Americas. There was no realistic prospect that actual trade would take place and the company never 
realized any significant profit from its monopoly. 
38  Isaac de Pinto, Traité de la Circulation et du Crédit [An Essay on Circulation and Credit] 
(Amsterdam, 1771), p.14. 
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Essay upon Ways and Means of Supplying the War (1695), that “the whole Art of 
War is in a manner reduced to Money, …, who can best find Money to feed, clothe 
and pay his army, not he that has the most valiant Troops, is surest of Success and 
Conquest.”39 This was also well understood by the historical experience of the 
repeated bankruptcies of Spanish during the Dutch Revolt, 40  and financial 
exhaustion of the Habsburg family towards the end of the Thirty Year’s war.41 On 
this aspect, Wilson (1941) notes how Britain had a military advantage in securing 
war finances by pooling foreign investments in the forms of national debt. Wilson 
illustrates that, 
“[despite disagreements on the dangers of public debt] all were 
agreed, however, on its importance, and French, Dutch and English 
observers speculated about its probable effects on the Anglo-French 
struggle … that England could not, from her own capital resources, 
have maintained such an immense navy, a land army in Europe, and 
great numbers of troops in three other quarters of the world, and have 
supplied subsidies to sustain her influence, as she had done.”42 
Wilson’s argument on the role of foreign investment to London as sources of 
English military power is reasonable when we observe the military spending of 
England at her times of war including the War of the Grand Alliance (1688-97), 
War of the Spanish Succession (1701-14) and the Seven Years War (1754-1763). 
                                                
39 Charles Davenant, An Essay upon Ways and Means of Supplying the War (London, 1695), pp. 26-7, 
re-quoted from Anne L. Murphy, The Origins of English Financial Markets (Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), p.39. 
40 In 1568, the Netherlands, led by William I of Orange revolted against Philip II of the House of 
Habsbourg. This was the due to the imposition of heavy taxes and constant persecution of the 
Protestants. 
41 Steve Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution (Yale University Press, 2009), p.311. 
42  Charles Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge 
University Press, 1941), p. 88. 
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Figure III-1 shows that military spending of Britain was on average was 
16% of British total revenue during the War of the Grand Alliance, 13% during the 
War of the Spanish Succession and  15 % during the Seven Years War. 43 Figure 
III-2 show that the highest military spending was in 1711 which recorded an 
extraordinary amount of 34% of total revenue, which accounts for £12,663,000 
alone in this year. 44 
 
Figure III–1. Military Spending Ratio of England, 1691-1760 

























Source: Brian R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 




                                                
43 Brian R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge University Press, 2011), Public Finance 
2. 





Figure III–2. Total Military Spending of the England, 1691-1760 

































Source: Brian R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics (Cambridge University Press, 2011), 




2.  Development of the Different Types of Debt 
The parliamentary archive, Accounts and Papers of the House of Commons (1869) 
keeps record of three general categories of debt from 1689 to 1800.45 Interests 
were paid differently according to the three general categories of debt.46 The 
different categories of debt are terminable annuities, unfunded debt and funded 
debt. The concept of public loan in the preceding literature have not necessarily 
been divided into different categories of loan. In this line of thought.  However, 
                                                
45 House of Commons, Public Income and Expenditure, 1868-69 (366) (366-I), Part II.  
46 House of Commons, Public Income and Expenditure, 1868-69 (366) (366-I), Part II.  
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distinguishing the types of loan is important because it facilitates the 
understanding of how the form and subject of credibility transformed during the 
18th century in relation to the government and market relation along with Dutch 
investors in the market. 
 
1) Terminable Annuities 
Terminable Annuities is a form of debt in which the government has liability to the 
public in respect of annuities sold for life and for terms of years. Terminable 
annuities were the predominant form of national debt in Britain until 1720 that 
mostly consisted of Exchequer annuities and lottery annuities. Debt charges on 
terminable annuities include interest of lottery annuities, Exchequer Annuities and 
life annuities. 
 
2) Unfunded Debt 
Unfunded debt consisted of loans that are redeemable at a definite date and largely 
resorted on the circulation Exchequer bills and loans raised in anticipation of 
duties. This short-term floating debt was had the smallest portion in British 
national debt which also became marginalized in 1720. Debt charges on unfunded 
debt predominantly included loans in anticipation of duties. 
 
3) Funded Debt 
Funded debt refers to long-term debt funded by partner institutions of the 
government including the Bank of England (1694), South Sea Company (1711) 
and East India Company (1600). Each of the institutions in its founding was 
privately owned by stockholders in forms of joint-stock companies, as a public-
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private partnership to jointly reduce the cost of debt.47 Funded debt, therefore, can 
be understood as funds that government owes to the private sector and pays 
interests to the private institutions. Because it is funded by independent institutions, 
the government make payments with higher interest along with the management 
cost of the public debt, referred as the funded debt charge. Funded debt was first 
issued in 1694 with the founding of the Bank of England but its active expansion 
occurs between 1710 and 1720. Debt charges on unfunded debt predominantly 
included Loans in anticipation of Duties. 
 
 
3. Sovereign Debt Restructuring from 1700 to 1720 
Previous literature have only observed the aggregate amount of debt to discuss 
credibility, however, when we divide debt under different categories of debt it is 
observable that the transition to modern forms of funded took place between 1700 
and 1720. As illustrated in Figure 3-1, by 1720, funded debt was the dominant 
form of national debt in Britain and interest paid for the funded debt took up the 
biggest share of the total debt charge. In fact, funded loan started to significantly 
expand after 1710 and reached its peak in the 1720s despite the fact that institutions 
that provided the funded loan, the earliest one being the Bank of England, were 






                                                
47 The Bank was privately owned by stockholders from its foundation in 1694 until it became 




Figure III–3. Debt Charges of Great Britain, 1691-1750 


































Source: Mitchell, B.R. 1998, British Historical Statistics, Public Finance 2 
 
Funded debt started to develop after the establishment of the Bank of England 
in 1694. Extensive use of funded debt was accessible with subsequent findings of 
the South Sea Company in 1711 and the East India Company though found in 
1600 started funding debt by 1699. The transfer of credibility from the government 
to the market, created a redistribution of power in the supply of the public funds 
from a large proportion of tax payers to a smaller number of bondholders. Funded 
debt reached its climax during the South Sea Bubble and by 1720, where the share 
of the British national debt held by the Bank of England, the East India Company, 
or the South Sea Company rose from zero in 1690 to 80 percent by 1720.48 
                                                
48 Stephen Quinn, “Securitization of Sovereign Debt: Corporations as a Sovereign Debt Restructuring 
mechanism in Britain, 1694-1750” Working Paper, p.2.  
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Mobilizing national debt by the initiatives of corporate entities was an important 
part of the funded debt in which Quinn (2004) goes so far as to label the 
transformation as the corporate ownership of debt.  
Before the funded debt, the only method known of railing money for the 
exigencies was to levy taxes or impositions, which were much felt and complained 
of by the people in general. But the newly devised funded debt allowed and 
abundant supply of finance without burthening the people and the indiscriminate 
supply indebted Britain heavily which generated fears within domestic politics 
Therefore, overcoming two challenges was critical to sustain and expand the 
funded debt. The first challenge was to reduce the mounting debt by actively 
implementing means of reimbursement. The second challenge was to decrease the 
cost of debt by controlling the interest rate.  
 
 
4. Chapter Summary 
The first section of this chapter provided the background of British finance before 
and after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. Before the Glorious Revolution, public 
borrowing in England was limited and greatly resorted to the reputation of the 
Crown. After the Glorious Revolution, England adopted financial innovations 
from its political ally, the Dutch, and developed moderns forms of debt that 
enabled access to unprecedented levels of debt and financial leverage in 
conducting wars in the mainland of Europe.  
The second part of this section explained the technicalities in the different 
types of debt: terminable annuities, unfunded debt and funded debt. To understand 
the difference between the different forms of debt illustrated in this section was 
crucial not only because it contours the restructuring of the national debt that took 
place in the 1700s and the 1720s, but more important because it helps the reader 
understand why shifting the focus from 1688 to 1710s and 1720s is important 
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explaining the development of modern forms of debt in Britain. While public 
ownership of debt such as terminable annuities and unfunded debt were the 
dominant forms of debt before the 1710s, private ownership of debt in forms of 
unfunded debt expanded between 1710 and 1720. The expansion of the funded 
debt is important because this private ownership of national debt reflects closely 
resembles the modern forms of debt. Therefore, the chapter convincingly shows 
that the development of the modern forms of debt did not occur after the Glorious 
Revolution in 1688 as most literature argue, but modern forms of debt only 
expanded between 1700 and 1720, leaving room for further exploration on the 




IV. Anglo-French Rivalry and the British Credit, 1700-1710 
The two political events– Britain’s commitment towards a strong power and 
internationalization of the British debt - reconstructed Britain’s reputation in the 
debt market between 1700 and 1710. The two events helped British reputation 
against France to become the predominant factor in determining British 
commitment to its debt. 
 
1. Britain as the Emerging War State 
1) Embarkation of the Anglo-Dutch Alliance in 1688 
The Glorious Revolution of 1688 to 1689 replaced the reigning king, James II, 
with the joint monarchy of his protestant daughter Mary and her Dutch husband, 
William of Orange. It set the supremacy of parliament over the crown, Whig over 
Tory, Protestant over Catholicism, and transfer of succession over hereditary 
monarchy. Most importantly, however, the Glorious Revolution marked the 
embarkation of the Anglo-Dutch alliance and the change of British foreign policy 
from anti-Dutch to anti-French. 
The decision of the Dutch to intervene in England was one of the unusual 
choices made by the Dutch. As Jonathan Israel argues, the intervention was “the 
boldest and riskiest strategic venture attempted by the Dutch Republic since its 
birth”.49 The invasion of William of Orange was essentially motivated with Dutch 
political interests. Despite the risks involved, the Dutch found an urgent need to 
strategically retrench and augment forces against expansionist France, pre-empt 
Anglo-French coalition and appoint a foreign general to command the Dutch army, 
a figure militarily competent but incapable of challenging the Holland regents in 
                                                




On the other hand, approval of William Orange in England also served two 
political purposes in England. Religious interest groups, both Protestants and 
Catholics were infuriated by James II and sought means to prevent the succession 
of a Catholic Crown. Furthermore, foreign policy interests were also the center in 
accepting Mary Stuart and William Orange as the new crown. With growing 
discontent towards James who had been trained in a French army, married Louis 
XIV's choice of bride and was an outspoken admirer of the modern absolutist state 
created by Louis XIV, Whig coalition strengthened by the support of mercantile 
interests that grew discontent with French rivalry over markets in colonies. 
Additionally, Pincus notes that the Dutch ceased to be an ideological threat to 
Britain after the Dutch political revolution in which the Dutch abandoned 
aggressive expansionist policies. In this sense French absolutism was a greater 
threat to Britain.51 
However, disagreements on foreign policy were extensive and continued even 
                                                
50 From the Dutch perspective, the nightmare of 1672 Franco-Dutch War, or the Third Anglo-Dutch 
war, was still a fresh memory in which the English backed Louis XIV in attempting to overrun the 
Low Countries. The Dutch found that another Anglo-French alliance would overwhelm the Republic. 
Political threat to its international position, impelled the Dutch to practice strategic retrenchment in 
bringing Britain to form the Grand Alliance against France while Anglo-Dutch hostility via the series 
of Anglo-Dutch war (1652-54, 1665-67, and 1672-74) had still been a fresh memory. Furthermore, 
the Dutch needed military support to fight land wars against France in the Southern Netherlands. The 
Dutch had considered themselves a maritime power during the period 1650 to 1672, in which the 
aggression of France forced the Republic to fight a land war in the Southern Netherlands. Dutch 
invasion of the Glorious Revolution enabled the Dutch to “off-shore” its land security to Britain. As 
originally envisaged in 1706, Holland wanted British support for a Dutch right to garrison whichever 
and as many towns and fortresses in the south Netherlands in exchange for guaranteeing the 
Protestant Succession in Britain. Dutch concern over their military power became a great political 
concern as its military debilitated by the end of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), 
impelling the need to practice a neutral policy after the Treat of Utrecht  that ended the War of the 
Spanish Succession. 
51 Steve Pincus, 1688: The First Modern Revolution (Yale University Press, 2009), 314. 
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in the early 1700s.52 Domestic debates continued over whether England should 
pursue the blue policy or the continent policy which was politicized between the 
Tories and the Whigs. 
 
2) Britain as a Balancer of Europe, 1700-1710 
The radical shift in British foreign policy from anti-Dutch to anti-French drew 
Britain into a defensive alliance with the Dutch Republic, against the increasingly 
alarming expansionist forces of Louis XIV in the European mainland. Despite the 
political complexities at home, Britain increasingly took a greater proportional role 
in the conflict with Louis XIV among the Grand Alliance throughout the 
eighteenth century, and this became evident between 1700 and 1710. British 
demonstrated military prowess via Malborough’s successive victory over the 
French military in driving the French forces back the Rhine by capturing Venlo, 
Roermond and Liege in 1702, Rijinberk, Bonn and Huy in 1703, and Bedburg in 
1704, that attracted speculative foreign investors. Malborough subsequently 
advanced toward the French center in 1705 and 1706. The prospect of a protracted 
warfare necessitated Britain to have stable channels of war finances to fuel the 
unprecedented levels of military spending.53 
 
                                                
52 Ahn examines extensive political journalism by Bolingbroke via the journal The Mercator that 
sought to win public support in normalizing Anglo-French trade. Ahn notes that discussions within 
the journal were politically and socially impactful that the Whig opposition found The British 
Merchant to refute and defend their stance. For further discussions see Doohwan Ahn, “The Anglo-
French Treaty of commerce of 1713: Tory Trade Politics and the Question of Dutch Decline”, History 
of European Ideas, Vol.36, No.2 (201), pp.167-180. 
53 The Grand Alliance was a European coalition against Louis XIV found in 1689, after joining of 
England. The Dutch Republic, Austria, Bavaria, Brandenburg, Holy Roman Empire, Ireland, 
Palatinate of the Rhine, Portugal, Savoy, Saxony, Scotland, Spain and Sweden and England were 
members of the Grand Alliance. 
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3) Military Reputation and the Flow of Credit, 1710-1710 
The depiction of the Glorious Revolution as the triumph of the parliament have 
hitherto driven the literature of credible commitment to set institutional veto points 
as the condition precedent to financial development. The role of reputation in 
public borrowing became marginalized and it no longer was the driving force for 
the development of institutional devices, but institutions itself became the 
pronominal word for reputation. The intuitional veto points approach argues that 
the preceding practice to rely on the Crown’s reputation became insufficient to 
police the default of the Crown and required institutional veto players to secure 
credibility. To solely rely on the Crown’s reputation would situate the monied 
interest into vulnerable positions whenever the sovereign had his survival at stake 
to heavily discounted the future and have stronger incentive to renege.  
However, as Britain entered into a binding alliance with the Grand Alliance to 
wage war against France, reputational commitment no longer became limited to 
the Crown but referred instead to the reputation of war-states and fiscal-military  
states. As Tomz (2007) argues, reputation of a state can be defined as the 
impression creditors hold about the borrower, in international debt markets with 
repeat play. Reputation of the borrower develops under the conditions of 
incomplete information in the market. In other words, the flow of investment is 
dependent on the impression creditors hold on the host country. In particular, the 
condition of incomplete information was stronger during the eighteenth century 
where investors had a stronger tendency to herd their investment based on what 
was manifested and especially the state’s military prowess. 
From the perspective of creditors, Britain was still a financial pygmy 
compared to her counterpart France, at the outset of the Glorious Revolution and 
the political stability of its regime was as questionable as its credit. However, 
Britain’s military outperformance over France in the European mainland and the 
prospect that Britain would soon parallel the major military powers of eighteenth-
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century Europe generated the impression that speculative investment in British 
debt would yield high net worth.  From the perspective of Britain, as the 
borrowing state, future channels of finances were valued to sustain the protracted 
war in Europe. Consequently Britain became increasingly reluctant to forgo its 
future finances by reneging its commitment and instead faced the burden to 
manifest policies that were favorable to debt servicing. 
 
 
2. Internationalization of the British Debt Market 
1) Foreign Investments in Britain, 1700-1710 
Another political change in Britain at the outset of the eighteenth century was the 
expansion of the debt market to foreign investors. The establishment of the Bank 
of England in 1694 enabled tranches or tradable securities for foreign creditors. 
Foreign investment did not expand, however, by the mere establishment of the 
Bank of England but it was the British demonstration of state military prowess 
over the French military in the early 1700s that attracted speculative foreign 
investors. Malborough’s subsequent advances towards the French center in 1705 
and 1706 generated greater investor confidence over Britain and by then the 
sovereign debt had already accounted of three seventh of foreign investment, most 
notably the Dutch.54  
It is undeniable that when financial markets are internationalized, the debt or 
the bond market play a crucial role in influencing, either directly or indirectly, the 
economic policies of the borrowing government. Sometimes the behavior of 
international body investors, known also as ‘bond vigilantes’ in financial jargon, is 
seen as beneficial because of the restraining influence they exert on the ability of 
                                                
54  Charles Wilson, Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge 
University Press, 1941), p.78. 
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governments to engage in reckless borrowing and spending.  
 
2) Fiscal Reputation and the Flow of Credit, 1700-1710 
Internationalization of the British debt market made reputation of Britain, and 
particularly her fiscal reputation an important factor to secure channels for 
finances. Internationalization of the debt market had the benefit that greater 
amount of finances could be pooled from outside. However, it also meant that in 
order to direct investors to Britain, Britain had to stop investment flowing out to 
other destinations such as France. In other words, Britain had the burden to show 
its fiscal outperformance over France to provide greater investor confidence and 
instigate herding of investors to Britain. As herding behavior is triggered by 
information spread amongst the investors, one way for Britain to instigate investor 
herding was to publicize government policies of debt servicing which provided 
better security conditions to that of the financial institutions in France. 
Attaining the consistency in government preference over debt servicing is an 
uneasy task for emerging economies as debt repayment creates economic winners 
and losers.55 However, Britain sought to find means to minimize the influence of 
divided opinions over her commitment to debt servicing by prioritizing her fiscal-




3. Chapter Summary 
This chapter showed that recasting the role of reputation is possible when we 
reconstruct reputation as the reputational commitment of war-states and fiscal-
                                                
55  Jeff Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940,” International 
Organization 42:1(1988), pp.59-90. 
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military states. The first section of the chapter discussed the first major political 
change in Britain between 1700 and 1710 that made reputation of Britain against 
France an important factor in securing credit in-flow to Britain. Britain’s military 
outperformance over France in the European main land and the prospect that 
Britain would soon parallel the major military powers of eighteenth-century 
Europe generated the impression that speculative investment in British debt would 
yield high net worth. 
In second section of the chapter, I illustrated another political change in 
Britain between 1700 and 1710 that made reputation of Britain against France an 
important factor in securing credit in-flow to Britain. The debt market of Britain 
became internationalized during this period where increasing amounts of foreign 
investments poured into Britain. With the prospect that the war in Europe was 
likely to be protracted, Britain found the need to secure the inflow of foreign 
investment by implementing policies that would elevate fiscal reputation of Britain 
over that of the French. 
The two political events between 1700 and 1710–Britain’s stronger 
commitment towards a strong power and internationalization of British debt 
market – was important because it shows why the Anglo-French rivalry over the 
fiscal-military reputation became important between 1710 and 1720 in explaining 




V. Anglo-French Rivalry and the British Credit, 1710-1720 
Public debt became a frequent subject of debate in the eighteenth century British 
parliament as public borrowing became deeply embedded in the British society 
and politics. The need for public loans seemed clear. As Dickson (1993) illustrates, 
they were the “Breath of Man's Nostrils,” and the dominant means to sustain the 
wars in Europe. On the other hand, the mounting loans simultaneously became the 
subject of fear especially in comparison to the debt that was being rapidly 
reimbursed in France. Two important events that helped Britain to restructure its 
national debt towards a greater share of funded debt were associated with the 
financial developments in France.  
 
1. Lowering the Cost of Debt 
1) Interest Rate Flexibility and Creditor Confidence 
From the perspective of creditors, interest rate can be an important indicator in 
understanding the risk associated in the investment. Investors in general demand 
higher interest payment to states with low credibility or high political instability. 
The higher the risk of default, the higher the arranged interest rate to compensate 
for the possibility of the reneging of loans. In other words, interest rates follow 
investor perceptions about the credit worthiness of a country to a great extent. On 
the other hand, the investors’ perception of the borrower’s credit does not 
necessarily reflect the actual financial accounts of the borrower. If enough 
investors begin to suspect that debt is not being controlled sufficiently, they 
perceive that the risk of defaults has risen, even if it is still very low. Thus a state’s 
credibility is extremely vulnerable to its financial reputation, and more so was this 
the case in the eighteenth century European setting where investors lacked 
sufficient channels to gain knowledge over the balance sheets and fiscal records of 
the borrowing state. 
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To the government, interest rate for loans is an indicator to gauge the 
availability of the extra cash flow for government spending. A government has 
high interest in maintaining a low interest rate for loans for two reasons: to secure 
access for future credits and lower the cost of debt. However, this preference only 
applies to states with particular interest to consistently support debt-servicing 
policies. If Britain did not have to commit to long run debt-servicing policies, 
Britain would have benefited far greater in maintaining high interest rates for loans 
instead of lowering its interest rate. This is because high interest rates generate the 
conditions for greater risk-taking behavior for the investors and encourages 
speculation over a steady stream of debt to be sold on.  
One counterfactual question that helps us understand the role of inter-state 
rivalry in the development of a state’s credit is to ask if Britain would have 
committed to its loans had it not been the case that Britain were to compete with 
France over the access of loans. Choosing to commit to its loans meant that Britain 
would forgo the inflow of short run speculative loans. Moreover, in the case of 
eighteenth century Britain, attaining consistency over the government preference 
for debt servicing was particularly difficult as Britain was yet an emerging 
economy and debt repayment created economic winners and losers.56 However, 
Britain chose to commit to its debt and implemented policies to lower the interest 
rate of loans. Why? Subsequent section shows that the decision to lower the 
interest rate in Britain was to compete with the lowered interest rate in France. 
Britain consistently competed with France to generate investor confidence for the 
investors and secure a steady channel of credit and this in turn pushed for 
structural changes and modernization of the British debt system. 
                                                
56  Jeff Frieden, “Sectoral Conflict and Foreign Economic Policy, 1914-1940,” International 
Organization 42:1(1988), pp.59-90. 
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2) Financial Innovations and the Low Interest Rate in France 
France had long saw with envy at British financial developments that followed the 
financial innovation of the Dutch Republic. A historical essay of a Dutch Jew 
investor, Isaac de Pinto Traité de la Circulation et du Crédit [An Essay on 
Circulation and Credit] (1771) notes,  
“that before the reign of King William no method was known of railing 
money for the exigencies of the year, except that of levying equivalent 
taxes or impositions; which, when great, as must necessarily happen in 
times of war, were much felt and complained of by the people in 
general, without any part of them being gainers by the public loss … 
But now a method was happily devised of abundantly supplying the 
Crown without burthening the people.”57  
In the outset of the eighteenth century, France was experimenting with various 
financial initiatives to develop cheaper and more flexible methods of short-term 
finance in competition against the Anglo-Dutch alliance. France re-implemented 
the Caisse des Emprunts in 1702 and the French savings banks offered an interest 
rate of 5 percent on demand deposits. Moreover, the issue of money notes by the 
French Treasury enabled the circulation of notes in France by a significantly low 
interest rate as low as 4 percent.58 The French fiscal policies were in sharp contrast 
to the policies of the British Treasury who circulated notes by an interest rate of 8 
percent.59 As Macdonald (2002) notes, France was advancing various initiatives to 
“develop cheaper and more flexible methods of short-term finance” to compete 
                                                
57 Allan Ramsay, An Essay on the Constitution of England (London: T. Becket & P.A. De Hondt, 
1765), p.84. 
58 French Treasures notes were interest-free in the first year. See, James Macdonald, A Free Nation 
Deep in Debt (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), p.181-184. 
59 House of Commons, Public Income and Expenditure, 1868-69 (366) (366-I), Part II. 
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with England and the Dutch.60 The lowered interest rates for French Treasury notes 
generated fear within the British political circles under the belief that the facilitated 
circulation of credit in France would significantly give France more fiscal-military 
competitiveness over Europe. 
 
3) The Tory Ministry and the Lowered Cost of Credit 
When the Tory ministry came to power in 1710, Britain was heavily involved in 
the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714) where England, the Dutch 
Republic and the Holy Roman Empire joined forces to balance their power against 
France to stop Philip V, the second-eldest grandson of King Louis XIV of France, 
succeeding the inheritance of Charles II, the last Habsburg king of Spain. While 
the Tory ministry represented the mercantile, aristocratic and landed interests 
during the Williamite England, the new moderate Tory ministry led by Lord High 
Treasurer Godolphin continued to support for Britain’s involvement in the war 
against France.61 It was also in the Tory’s interest to uphold the anti-French foreign 
policy in order to protect British commercial interests abroad from the French 
influence, although many Tories who preferred for a stricter maritime strategy 
disliked Malborough’s push for a more aggressive and deeper involvement in the 
Continental War.62  
In terms of finance, it was expected by many spectators that the Tory ministry 
would lack incentives to actively expand and promote institutions for public 
borrowing. This was because Tories have traditionally been in opposition to the 
                                                
60 James Macdonald, A Free Nation Deep in Debt (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2003), 
p.184. 
61 Bromley, John Selwyn. 1970. The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 6: The Rise of Great 
Britain and Russia, 1688-1715/25. London: Cambridge University Press, p.414. 
62 Bromley, John Selwyn. 1970. The New Cambridge Modern History, Volume 6: The Rise of Great 
Britain and Russia, 1688-1715/25. London: Cambridge University Press, p.416. 
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Whigs that represented the monied interests and government debt was managed by 
the Bank of England, an institution that predominately included many members of 
the Whigs, in large shares. Thus, for Tories to expand sovereign debt and its 
institutions for public borrowing would lead to feeding their political enemies with 
great financial power and fiscal control over public expenditures.  
The Tories, in fact, increasingly grew concerned for the servicing of the 
already accumulated debt, which was consuming an unprecedented portion of 
government tax revenues. Almost 50 percent of the state’s income was spent on 
interest payments and the political concern that France would gain financial 
leverage over Britain pushed the Tory Ministry to take active actions for the 
repayment of debt. As Table V-1 indicates, public debt was the highest in the first 
years of the Tory ministry whereby the deficit ratio reached an unprecedented level 
of 86% in 1710 and 192% in 1711. The Tory ministry, however, was quick to keep 
the deficit ratio lower than they were during the Whig’s rules, reaching as low as 
15% of its national revenue by 1714.  
Table V-1. Public borrowing of English Government from 1708-1714 
Majority￡ Year￡ Revenue (￡) Deficit (￡) Deficit /Revenue￡ 
Whig 1708 37,243,933 18,249,527 0.49 
Whig 1709 37,229,631 28,294,519 0.76 
Tory 1710 37,529,985 32,275,787 0.86 
Tory 1711 37,036,546 71,110,168 1.92 
Tory 1712 41,105,631 15,209,083 0.37 
Tory 1713 41,334,473 4,133,447 0.10 
Tory 1714 38,338,081 5,750,712 0.15 
Source: Values for the deficit were recalculated from revenue and deficit to revenue 
ratio data provided by Dincecco, Mark. Political Transformations and Public Finances: 
Europe, 1650-1913. Cambridge University Press, Political Economy of Institutions and 
Decisions Series, 2011 
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When interest rates are lowered, governments gain a clear advantage by 
having access to large sums of money bearing the minimum cost. However, 
decreasing the interest rate is not an easy task because it confronts creditor rights 
and privileges: unless the creditor has confidence in sovereign credibility, it is 
difficult to bargain for a lower interest. This was particularly the case when the 
Tory majority in the House of Commons tried to lower the interest rate in 1711 
against the “Whig” Bank of England and the East India Company.  
The Tories achieved their goal to lower the interest rate by setting up a new 
trading company, the South Sea Company to overturn the Bank of England’s 
increasing monopoly on government funding. To override the Bank of England 
and set the South Sea Company as the dominant institution managing government 
finances, the South Sea Company commenced its operation by suggesting 6 
percent of interest rate on loans, which was 2 percent lower to what the Bank of 
England had offered in the past 14 years since its establishment. The Bank of 
England, in order to compete with the South Sea Company had no other choice but 
to lower its interest to 6 percent in 1711 as illustrated in Table V-2. 
 
Table V-2. Private Sector Interest Rate on Public Borrowing, 1694-1750 
 Bank of England South Sea Company East India Company 
1694-1698 8   
1699-1710 8  8 
1711-1720 6 6 5 
1721-1750 6 5 4 
Source: House of Commons, Public Income and Expenditure, 1868-69 (366) (366-I), Part II. 
Note: There is irregularity in the interest rates of the East India Company where in the year 1709, 





The founding of the South Sea Company, therefore, enabled a major 
reduction of debt charges via a lowered interest rate. This in turn enabled the 
expansion of the funded debt, since the funded debt was cheaper and preferred 
over the unfunded debt by the government. Moreover, channels for public 
borrowing were no longer monopolized by the Bank of England, but instead were 
open to competition, especially over the cost of its supply.  
Furthermore, the Tories actively restructured expensive unfunded debt and 
terminable annuities to relatively cheaper funded debts. Holders of departmental 
notes were allowed to exchange them for shares in the South Sea Company and 
through this method 9.2 million pounds of short-term debt were voluntarily 
tendered for shares in the South Sea Company in 1711. By 1719 the South Sea 
Company takes up another leap in its share in controlling the national debt, 
illustrated in Figure V-1, for reasons that were different to its increase in share in 
the year 1711. The next section deals with the circumstances of 1719 and the 
subsequent South Sea Bubble that broke out in 1720 in relations to the Whig 














Figure V–1. Interest Paid to Bank of England, South Sea Company and East India 
Company, 1688-1750 


































2. The Grand Redemption Scheme 
1) Deficit Reduction and State Credibility 
At the most basic level, what creditors expect, and especially the creditors of the 
bond markets expect, is a reassurance that borrowers will be able to repay their 
debts. Naturally when the amount of debts held by the host government become 
excessive, lenders get apprehensive and nervous. From the perspective of the host 
country, in order to soothe the anxiety of the investors and secure the availability 
of future credit, the host government would produce a deficit reduction plan which 
involves paying back the principal. The bigger the redemption scheme, the less 
nervous the lenders feel about the prospect of debt repayments.  
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The readiness of borrowers to repay the debt can also be interpreted as a 
healthy sign that the borrowing government is taking the problem of indebtedness 
seriously. Creditors naturally find the adoption of redemption policies by the 
government as a ‘credible’ attempt to reduce indebtedness. As a consequence 
deficit reduction plans are found credible in the financial markets. 
The redemption plan in the eighteenth century Britain may have been a strong 
indicator to her creditors because unlike the contemporary government borrowing 
that is used to finance productive investment that have prospects of higher future 
flow of credit, British government borrowing in the eighteenth century was 
purposed to finance wars and therefore the principal was consumed without 
financial yield. Therefore, the ‘willingness’ of the British government to repay the 
debt, or the ‘credibility’ of a deficit reduction plan, would have mattered in great 
extent to the investors of Britain even if the actual repayment was not under 
process. In fact, this section shows that while Britain was not obliged to pay back 
the principal for the funded debt, according to the characteristics of the funded 
debt, she implemented redemption policies to compete against France over the 
securitization of future channels to finances.  
 
2) The Mississippi Company and the Cheap Debt in France 
When the War of the Spanish Succession ended in 1714 with the financial 
exhaustion of the major power involved, reducing the volume of public debt was 
one of the prioritized fiscal agenda for each state. The first powers to repay the 
debt and reduce their fiscal baggage meant that they would have advantages when 
war were to break out again.63 France actively sought to reconstruct its fiscal 
institutions after the war via the founding of the Banque Générale in 1716 and the 
                                                
63 John, Brewer, The sinews of power: War, money, and the English state, 1688-1783 (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), p. 98-99. 
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Mississippi Company in 1719. Banque Générale (later renamed as Banque Royale 
in 1719) and the Mississippi Company (later renamed Compagnie des Indes) 
devised by John law aggressively modeled the British or Dutch financial practice 
with the aim to make Paris the financial rival of Amsterdam and London.64 Banque 
Générale issued deposit notes or “paper money” that were repayable at a constant 
amount of specie. This liberated France from the use of the unstable livre. The 
development of the Banque Générale was threatening to Britain because Banque 
Générale lent money at 6% initially and then lowered its interest rate to 4%, a 
significantly lower rate compared to what Britain’s private sector was offering. 
Deposits poured in to Banque Générale, and by the end of 1718, there were 149 
million Banque Générale notes in circulation. Moreover, South Sea Company had 
provided the model for the flotation of the Mississippi Company, a vehicle to 
permit the government to change short-term into long-term debt by adding the lure 
of trading profits to the basic interest income. The Mississippi Company that was 
granted a monopoly in France’s Mississippi territory in North America, started to 
absorbed the other French chartered trading companies. This rapid development of 
the Banque and the Mississippi Company generated fears in Britain that France 
would recover from the ruins of war faster than expected.  
 
3) South Sea Company and the Bargain for Private Ownership of Debt 
After the signing of the Treaty of Utrecht in 1714 and the advent of peace, Britain 
was faced with the task to clear the enormous amount debt that had accumulated 
during the protracted war against France. The British government actively sought 
to show their determination to service its debts to the creditors and to eventually 
reduce the principal of its debt. This commitment was forwarded particularly in 
awareness of the fiscal recovery in France. As expressed by Charles Davenant and 
                                                
64 Macdonald, p.179  
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re-quoted by Brewer, “every attempt at debt retrenchment was made by English 
government with one eye warily watching events on the other side of the Channel 
[France].”65  
In response to the financial developments in France after the war, Britain also 
found active measures to expand the funded debt by extending corporate 
ownership or private sector claim over the national debt. When the Whig gained 
back their majority in the Commons in 1715, the national task to reduce the debt 
faster than France was an ongoing agenda. Subsequently, another redemption plan 
called the “sinking fund” was suggested by Earl Stanhope and established by 
Robert Walpole in 1716. The scheme was to group together the many little items 
of revenue that was each mortgaged to some particular debt, in to four large funds: 
the Aggregate, South Sea, General and Sinking funds.66 The first three were 
composed of permanent taxes, and it secured the interest charges on three great 
blocks of public debt. The fourth was made up of the surpluses of the first in which 
after satisfying all charges upon its original debt, additional sums would be 
transferred to the fourth block. It was called the “sinking fund” because it was 
appropriated to the sinking of the national debt and to no other purpose.67 This 
allowed flexibility in the growing system of finance where surplus yielded in one 
category could be allocated to repay the debt.  
 
                                                
65 See Charles Davenant, “Discourses on the Public Revenues, and on the Trade of England, in Two 
Parts [1698],” The Political and Commercial Works of that Celebrated Writer, Charles 
Davenant…Collected and revised by Sir Charles Whitworth (London, 1771), vol. 1, p. 
172; John, Brewer, The sinews of power: War, money, and the English state, 1688-1783 (London: 
Harvard University Press, 1990), p.100. 
66 Edward A. Ross, “Sinking Funds,” Publications of the American Economic Associations 7:4(1892), 
pp.9-106. 





Table V-3. Public borrowing of English Government from 1716-1720 


























Source: Values for the deficit were recalculated from revenue and deficit to revenue 
ratio data provided by Dincecco, Mark. Political Transformations and Public Finances: 
Europe, 1650-1913. Cambridge University Press, Political Economy of Institutions and 
Decisions Series, 2011 
 
The sinking fund created a psychological effect of relief, which eased the 
public concerns over the mounting funded debt of the British government. As Ross 
(1892) points out, even when the British government was borrowing loans placing 
itself to further debt obligation, the existence of the sinking fun effectively lulled 
people to believe that the national debt was being swiftly and surely extinguished. 
Despite the fact that the sinking fund only lasted until 1733 where Walpole broke 
into the fund for his personal needs and the sinking fund eventually was obscured 
by 1752, the existence of the fund was enough to boost public credibility and 
extend the creation of funded debt further. Table V-4 shows that the funded debt 
started out small which amounted to £856,000 in 1716 jumps to £ 1,112,000 in 








Table V-4. Debt Charges of Britain 1716-1720 
Debt Charges (£) 
Year Total Funded Terminable Annuities Unfunded 
1716 3,027,000 856,000 1,689,000 461,000 
1717 3,440,000 1,112,000 1,870,000 458,000 
1718 2,839,000 1,383,000 1,073,000 375,000 
1719 2,706,000 1,465,000 1,003,000 208,000 
1720 2,769,000 1,716,000 943,000 96,000 
Source: Values were extracted from B. R. Mitchell, British Historical Statistics 
(London: Cambridge University Press, 1998). 
 
With the increasing share of the national debt to the private sector, 
competition between the private institutions over greater shares for the sovereign 
debt became intense. By the late 1710s, party identification of the private 
institutions including the South Sea Company and the Bank of England became 
obscure as many Whig investors had shares in the South Sea Company and vice 
versa. Therefore the British parliament held private institutions in competition and 
gave preference to the institution that provided with greater sums of loans bearing 
the minimum cost. Macdonald (2003) notes that parliamentary records also 
indicate that the South Sea Company and the Bank of England proposed at the 
parliament in January 1720 for the ownership over the entire national debt.68 Both 
of the corporations proposed an offer to cancel existing debts in exchange for the 
perpetual redeemable annuities paying 5 percent.  
In the process of granting more ownership over national debt to the private 
sector, the British government was able to reduce some of the existing debts as 
                                                
68 Macdonald, p.178. 
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well as save charges on future debts. The outcome of the bargaining was the 
extension and allocation of a greater share of the national debt to the funded debt. 
The share of the British national debt held by the Bank of England, the East India 
Company, or the South Sea Company rose from zero in 1690 to 80 percent in 
1720.69 Exchequer tallies, Exchequer bills, and Bank of England notes all rested on 
the credit of the private sector. 
 
Figure V–2. Total Debt and Reimbursement of Britain, 1688-1740 





































Total Paid Off Debt
 
Source: House of Commons, Public Income and Expenditure, 1868-69 (366) (366-I), Part 
II. 
 
Efforts of the British government to repay the debt faster and make the cost of 
debt cheaper in competition to its counterpart, France, was successful. Figure V-2 
shows that the reimbursement is made proportionally to the debt after 1710. The 
                                                
69 Quinn, p.2 
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reimbursement was the outcome of active commitment. The most extensive 
amount of reimbursement came with South Sea Bubble in 1720.  
Brewer (1989) provides a swift yet insightful analysis in explaining the three 
factors contributed to the South Sea Bubble in 1720: British government’s haste to 
reduce the cost of national debt in competition with France, the rivalry between the 
Bank of England and the South Sea company over the ownership of public debt 
and unresolved debt charges from the traditional forms of debt which were the 
terminable annuities. The South Sea Bubble, in essence, was the British 
government effort to transform old forms of debt, the terminable annuities, to 
modern forms of debt. In the process annuitants were advised to voluntarily 
exchange their annuities stocks in on the private institutions. Once the annuitant 
transferred their securities to redeemable stocks, the government could reduce their 
cost paid to the large number of irredeemable securities via a lowered interest 
assigned to the stock. While annuitants lacked the incentive to convert their 
annuities to stocks, the government pressured for their action by passing the South 
Sea Act of 1720 that enabled the South Sea Company to provide cash or newly 
create stocks to lull the annuitants. Such government effort to reduce the cost of 
debt, would ultimately not have been pushed for if the British government was not 
in competition with France. As Brewer notes, “in the short term, the South Sea 
Bubble was a major disaster…[but] In the long run its consequences were more 
beneficial” in successfully restructuring the national debt to modern forms of debt. 
 
 
3. Chapter Summary 
This chapter focused on the British financial developments between 1710 and 
1720 to explain how Anglo-French rivalry triggered consistent government 
preference for debt servicing despite the shifting powers in the House of Commons 
between the Whigs and the Tories. 
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 In the first section of the chapter, I argued that the Tory ministry’s effort to 
continue the debt servicing policy by inducing interest rate flexibility of loans was 
triggered by the financial innovation in France in 1702, where the French had re-
established their saving banks and facilitated the flow of Treasury notes to develop 
cheaper and flexible methods of short-term finance. In response to these French 
developments the Tory ministry set up a new trading company in 1711, the South 
Sea Company to lower the interest rate and overturn the Bank of England’s 
increasing monopoly on government funding. Consequently, low interest rates 
encouraged speculation in the debt market of Britain which helped the private 
financial market to develop further. 
The second section of the chapter elaborated on the second government 
scheme implemented by the Whigs to support the debt servicing policies. The 
redemption scheme to repay loan principals via the establishment of the sinking 
fund was triggered by the founding of the Banque Générale in 1716 and the 
Mississippi Company in 1719 which gave France the financial leverage in 
circulating her credit. Britain was pressured to adopt measures to provide better 
debt services to that of what was provided in France. As a solution, Britain 
implemented redemption policies even though she was not obliged to pay back the 
principal for the funded debt, according to the characteristics of the funded debt. 
As a result, repayment of debt enhanced investor confidence and in the funded 
debt in general. This enabled the restructuring of the national debt to greater 




This dissertation focused on the eighteenth century Anglo-French rivalry 
underpinning British financial growth to argue that the pressure to financially 
outperform France provided Britain the incentives to implement schemes that 
restructured the debt market, from public ownership of debt to modern forms of 
private holdings. The two grand schemes were to convert the unfunded debt to the 
funded debt by inducing interest rate flexibility of loans and reducing the cost of 
debt via the sinking fund and the South Sea Bubble. The implementation of each 
scheme was triggered by financial developments in France. As a result, the two 
schemes committed Britain to lower the cost of its national debt and 
institutionalize private sector control over the national debt.  
Specifically, I argued that focusing on the financial developments from 1700 
to 1720 was important because when distinguishing the different types of debt, the 
twenty years starting from 1700 to 1720 is the transitional period where old forms 
of debt are restructured to modern forms of funded debt. Put in other words, the 
ownership of the national debt restructures from the public sector to the private 
sector, typically in forms of the bond market. This dissertation has divided the 
twenty years into 1700-1710 and 1710-1720 to analyze major financial 
developments that enabled the restructuring of the national debt. 
 From 1700 to 1710, two political events affected Britain to compete for its 
fiscal-military reputation over France, in order to secure finance in the debt 
market. Britain’s military outperformance over France and internationalization of 
the British debt market, made Britain increasingly reluctant to forgo its future 
finances by reneging its commitment. To sustain the inflow of investment from 
foreign creditors, reputation fiscal-military mattered and especially Britain had the 
pressure to consistently manifest her devotion to consistent implementation of debt 
servicing policies despite domestic complexities. 
From 1710 to 1720, Britain implemented two grand schemes that restructured 
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British national debt from unfunded debt to modern forms of funded debt. Each of 
the schemes was achieved in response to the financial developments in France. 
The first scheme to lower the interest rate of the national debt was implemented by 
the Tories in 1711 via the founding of the South Sea Company. This scheme was 
triggered by developments in 1702 France where their saving banks were re-
established and their Treasury notes were circulating faster via the lowered interest 
rate on the Treaty notes. The second scheme to repay the debt was implemented by 
the Whigs in 1716 in response to the seemingly rapid fiscal recovery of France via 
the development of the Mississippi Company in 1716. In response, Britain actively 
sought to repay their public debt via the sinking fund and lower the cost of debt 
further by generating the South Sea Bubble that encouraged the private sector to 
provide speculative incentives to absorb the old forms of debt to modern forms of 
government bonds.  
The thesis, thus, provides two significant implications for international 
political economy. First, this thesis shows how inter-state relations influence the 
trajectories of financial growth for a state. I argued that the international dimension 
or the Anglo-French rivalry provides a better explanation in explaining the 
restructuring of old forms of national debt to modern forms of national debt. 
Recasting the international dimension to the discussion suggests that international 
factors can equally, and more powerfully explain government finance.  
More importantly, however, this thesis provides implications for hegemonic 
rivalry and its effect on financial growth. Great Britain, a passive engager to the 
continent in the early 18th century would not have risen as a European hegemon by 
the end of the century, if it were not for the restructuring of the debt market that 
efficiently channeled war finances. While the rise of fiscal-military state is only 
proportional to a state’s fiscal ability to secure finances, access to unprecedented 




Appendix 1. Total Revenue of England and France, 1680-1740 
£ England  France  England France 
1680 13099741  58007433 1711 37036546 45746624 
1681 11039453  59848632 1712 41105631 50451968 
1682 9455799  62564212 1713 41334473 51522240 
1683 9893995  60662285 1714 38338081 53041408 
1684 9963183  72886425 1715 39668221 74178496 
1685 9701804  66799614 1716 39918517 74178492 
1686 14468141  67167746 1717 47692660 75891200 
1687 16028732  63034991 1718 43995122 53855700 
1688 15052402  63271993 1719 44044324 44205067 
1689 22071219  73523267 1720 45646541 31409419 
1690 22071219  68842335 1721 43426220 41851764 
1691 22071219  74548428 1722 44992943 62605767 
1692 31603894  73363797 1723 43761986 47649214 
1693 29082348  72111179 1724 42224906 41061676 
1694 30781317  65261375 1725 43613176 46701470 
1695 31780710  70078395 1726 40416816 68392827 
1696 33706809  70161108 1727 44701672 66234194 
1697 23048944  70653809 1728 48982500 62529677 
1698 31994562  54706314 1729 45532310 65627419 
1699 36929276  57464007 1730 45635082 62497742 
1700 31065216  55966340 1731 44397276 65467742 
1701 26953223  58749519 1732 42354682 62465806 
1702 34819645  54894821 1733 40256493 69268065 
1703 39768340  47402049 1734 39763624 82744839 
1704 38574074  55176079 1735 41088640 82393548 
1705 37844642  55646506 1736 42055433 74090323 
1706 37787431  64672761 1737 44333732 63775161 
1707 39124723  66154365 1738 41749084 66681290 
1708 37243933  54995339 1739 42568674 68980645 
1709 37229631  53691702 1740 42039882 67351935 




Appendix 2. Total Military Spending of England, 1691-1760 
(in £ thousand sterling) Army Navy Ordnance Military Total 
1691 5200 3098 659 8957 
1692 1900 1239 254 3393 
1693 2346 1925 380 4651 
1694 2119 2132 239 4490 
1695 2559 1890 417 4866 
1696 1749 1922 253 3924 
1697 2646 2822 521 5989 
1698 1343 877 49 2269 
1699 1018 1232 44 2294 
1700 359 819 73 1251 
1701 442 1046 50 1538 
1702 1102 2094 117 3313 
1703 1770 1724 173 3667 
1704 2107 1630 157 3894 
1705 2146 1772 183 4101 
1706 2741 1949 271 4961 
1707 3188 2297 287 5772 
1708 3183 1909 229 5321 
1709 2969 2117 282 5368 
1710 4463 2422 276 7161 
1711 4853 7476 334 12663 
1712 2837 1776 165 4778 
1713 1267 1457 95 2819 
1714 884 1043 76 2003 
1715 924 1205 90 2219 
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1716 2151 792 180 3123 
1717 980 443 39 1462 
1718 1204 1350 120 2674 
1719 1186 1293 159 2638 
1720 965 1181 108 2254 
1721 754 705 99 1558 
1722 1011 1666 108 2785 
1723 895 827 89 1811 
1724 856 630 120 1606 
1725 773 601 95 1469 
1726 992 695 100 1787 
1727 1191 833 115 2139 
1728 1378 1539 201 3118 
1729 1293 925 164 2382 
1730 1203 1033 123 2359 
1731 1353 815 140 2308 
1732 1012 700 113 1825 
1733 791 555 148 1494 
1734 707 2079 462 3248 
1735 1037 1545 155 2737 
1736 1185 1390 142 2717 
1737 835 933 327 2095 
1738 846 819 115 1780 
1739 1066 988 156 2210 
1740 1418 1607 187 3212 
1741 1776 2419 320 4515 
1742 2523 2795 340 5658 
1743 2878 2736 363 5977 
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1744 3227 2709 364 6300 
1745 2790 2688 345 5823 
1746 3729 2396 579 6704 
1747 3679 3176 516 7371 
1748 4172 3361 571 8104 
1749 2339 5606 536 8481 
1750 1338 1385 228 2951 
1751 1383 895 102 2380 
1752 976 1854 154 2984 
1753 1140 849 133 2122 
1754 1071 944 150 2165 
1755 1399 1814 177 3390 
1756 2396 2714 426 5536 
1757 3210 3595 520 7325 
1758 4586 3893 547 9026 
1759 5744 4971 729 11444 















Appendix 3. Total Debt Charges in Britain, 1688-1750 
	  Debt Charges (in £ thousand sterling) 










1694 442 12 111 319 
1695 581 107 190 284 
1696 651 66 262 323 
1697 1044 127 283 634 
1698 1467 186 469 812 
1699 1484 243 305 898 
1700 1251 218 331 701 
1701 1200 222 304 675 
1702 1174 256 315 603 
1703 1042 285 307 450 
1704 977 260 338 374 
1705 1036 260 435 367 
1706 1078 268 449 350 
1707 1846 322 680 842 
1708 1637 315 735 585 
1709 2014 311 1070 602 
1710 1754 317 733 584 
1711 1813 347 763 612 
1712 2360 709 1080 485 
1713 2888 943 1414 531 
1714 3021 834 1604 583 
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1715 3276 1237 1540 492 
1716 3027 856 1689 461 
1717 3440 1112 1870 458 
1718 2839 1383 1073 375 
1719 2706 1465 1003 208 
1720 2769 1716 943 96 
1721 3314 2857 362 88 
1722 3012 2544 212 232 
1723 2919 2523 267 105 
1724 2864 2461 281 115 
1725 2796 2432 268 86 
1726 2667 2353 224 88 
1727 2783 2448 203 122 
1728 2335 2006 208 121 
1729 2284 1998 184 97 
1730 2280 2001 187 85 
1731 2120 1850 186 83 
1732 2217 1959 182 66 
1733 2143 1888 182 73 
1734 2052 1792 182 76 
1735 2174 1863 186 125 
1736 2127 1829 179 119 
1737 2105 1808 181 114 
1738 2059 1753 184 122 
1739 2047 1762 181 103 
1740 2102 1790 185 128 
1741 2032 1727 177 128 
1742 2041 1690 182 170 
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1743 2117 1725 170 181 
1744 2178 1824 154 191 
1745 2259 1855 153 169 
1746 2316 1945 172 189 
1747 2716 2208 210 282 
1748 2842 2306 219 194 
1749 2981 2449 217 162 


















Appendix 4 Interest Paid to the Private Sector, 1680-1740 
Year Bank of England South Sea Company East India Company 
1694 12,000   
1695 107,000   
1696 66,000   
1697 127,000   
1698 186,000   
1699 130,000  113,000 
1700 93,000  125,000 
1701 96,000  125,000 
1702 111,000  145,000 
1703 106,000  179,000 
1704 100,000  160,000 
1705 100,000  160,000 
1706 95,000  160,000 
1707 100,000  185,000 
1708 105,000  171,000 
1709 95,000  176,000 
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국  문  초  록  
 
본 연구는 18세기 영국의 국가 재정 발전사를 통해 영국의 부상을 
설명한다. 강대국 간의 패권 경쟁이 치열했던 18세기 유럽에서, 적국보다 더 
많은 전비와 투자금을 확보하는 것은 모든 국가들의 핵심 목표였다. 18 세기 
초까지만 해도, 재정 및 군사적 차원에서 변방이었던 영국은 재정-군사 
국가(fiscal-military state)의 기틀을 다지기 위해 정부 부채를 본격적으로 
확대했으며, 이를 위해 유럽의 열강들보다 한 발 앞서 ‘민간 은행의 채무 증서 
발행’을 통한  근대적 의미의 정부 부채 시스템을 도입하는데 성공했다. 
 이 글은 영국과 프랑스의 경쟁이라는 대외적 요인이 영국의 근대적 
정부 부채 시스템 도입을 촉진했다고 주장한다. 이를 보이기 위해, 영국 국가 
부채 시스템의 근대 이행기였던 1700 년부터 1720년을 분석했다. 해당 시기, 
영국은 프랑스의 금융 발전에 대응하여 두 가지 정책을 시행했다. 첫째, 
1702년 프랑스가 정부 부채의 상환 이자를 인하시킴으로써, 부채 비용을 
감소시키자, 영국은 남해회사 (South Sea Company)  설립을 통해 자국의 부채 
상환 이자를 인하했다. 둘째, 1716 년 프랑스가 프랑스 은행 (Banque 
Générale)의 국고증권(treasury note) 발행을 늘리는 한편, 단기 부채를 장기 
부채로 전환시키면서 국가 대출 비용을 낮추자, 영국은 1716년부터 국가 
조세 수입의 미지출분을 통해 자국의 국채 원금을 상환함으로써 국가 
신용도를 증진시켰다. 
프랑스와의 경쟁 속에서 영국이 더 많은 투자를 확보하기 위해 




영국은 국가 보유고보다 훨씬 더 많은 자본을 창출할 수 있었다. 이러한 
재정적 기반을 밑거름 삼아 영국은 재정 강대국으로 부상하게 되었다. 
본 연구는 다음과 같은 국제정치경제적 함의가 있다.  첫째, 본 연구는 
국가 금융 발전 과정에서 주목받지 못했던 ‘국제적 요인’의 설명 변수로서의 
중요성을 조명했다. 이런 주장은 국내 정치적 요인(납세 문화, 의회 
민주주의)에 집중했던 기존 연구를 보완한다. 
둘째, 이 글은 국가의 정치적 선택이 국가 금융 발전의 전환에 
결정적인 영향을 미친다고 주장했다. 금융 발전을 단선적으로 해석한 
역사학과 시장 논리를 통해 해석한 경제학은 정치적 결단의 중요성을 과소 
평가했다. 본 연구는 프랑스와의 패권 경쟁에서 도전국의 위치였던 영국이 
금융 패권으로 자리매김 한 데에는, 영국의 전략적 선택이 있었음을 보였다. 
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